June 2003




The case study dedicated to Aurul tailings pond illustrates the use of risk analysis for developing a proper risk management program after a severe technical accident.




#### **INITIAL LAYOUT**

Flat land pond
Area: 89ha.
Volume: 15 mil. m<sup>3</sup>
Maximum height of the contour dike: 17-18m



June 2003



June 2003



#### The technical accident

#### On January 30, 2000, at 10pm

- \* a breach of approx. 20m, with a depth expansion until the top of the starter dike on the southern side of the pond
- \* 100.000 m³ of cyanide-contaminated water were released, beyond control



#### Dike breach after the technical accident



June 2003



. Brerach closure to stop spillage



June 2003

June 2003



#### **TECHNICAL ACCIDENT CAUSES**

- The faulty design integral recirculation of water
- The excessive input of rainwater. massive thawing + rain of 35.7 l/m<sup>2</sup>

MONTREAL

- Lack of adequate monitoring



## A preliminary risk evaluation based on numerical indices

(a) allows for a rational rating of constructive measures

#### A complete quantitative risk assessment

@renders evident the efficiency and the benefits of the structural and non-structural measures in terms of risk management.



## FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS Criticality index:

 $IG = CM \cdot PC \cdot DC$ 

where:

*CM* - expresses the component share in the failure mechanism;

*PC* - expresses the component failure probability;

**DC** - expresses the extent to which the component failure may be detected in advance.



## Criticality index IG for Aurul pond

Parameter	CM	PC	DC	<i>IG</i> =
/component			C	$M \cdot PC \cdot DC$
Freeboard	5	4	1	20
Beach width	4	4	1	16
Downstream slope	5	4	1	20
Grain size of dikes	3	4	3	36*
Water collecting system	5	3	4	60 ***
Drainage system	5	2	4	40**
Pond-plant pipes	3	4	2	24

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
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
June 2003





# Prioritization of safety measures established on the basis of criticality index IG:


- performance of a second decant tower was given priority
- effective drainage of the perimeter dike
- close monitoring through an adequate system














# Increasing safety measures: ② second penstock; ③ supplementary pump unit with a Diesel engine; ② treatment plant for the decant water, 150 m³/h capacity; ③ direct discharge of 100 m³/h with pipe treatment.



#### Failure probabilities

#### **Probability of primary events:**

# cyclical actions - annual probability based on statistic study of annual maximum values

# engineering judgment - annual probabilities on the basis of some numerical equivalence

Dam breaching failure probability:

initial

 $P_b = 4.46 \times 10^{-3}$ 

with safety measures  $P_b = 1.412 \times 10^{-3}$ 



## Consequences global quantification

$$C = \beta \Sigma_i CG_i P_{ei} \alpha_i$$

where:

CG; - the gravity index of consequence i;

P<sub>i</sub> - the probability of effective emergence of category of consequence i;

α<sub>i</sub> - efficiency of the mitigation measures

β - owner's capacity to intervene rapidly for the breach closure.

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### CG Index – gravity consequences

i=1 casualties (C)  $CG_1 = 10^6$ 

i=2 effects on the environment (EE)  $CG_2 = 10^6$ 

i=3 economic loss for the third parties (DTP)

 $CG_3 = 10^3$ 

i=4 damage to the owner (DD)  $CG_4 = 5x10^2$ 

i=5 effects on the company image (EI) CG<sub>5</sub>=10<sup>2</sup>

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### **Risk management considerations**

- Risk control is ensured by the imposed safety measures, by monitoring the tailings pond behavior and by complying strictly with the operation regulations.
- The failure probability of  $1.4 \times 10^{-4}$  is in the range of the tolerable limits for earth dams.
- Reduction of more than 3 times of the probable consequences by successive defensive lines is a rare case in the tailings pond field.